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Purpose of Study.—The paramount purpose of this
study is to examine the Philippines' quest and struggle
for independence and the role America played in the process.
Another reason is to suggest why America did not want to
grant the Philippines its independence. With the rise of
nationalism came the feeling of a desire to be free, a
desire to have their own sovereignty — combined with
suppression, economic exploitation, a denial of self-rule,
the independence struggle came into existence.
In specific terms, the purposes of this study are:
(1) to examine Spanish occupation of the Philippines as
well as the social, economic and political institutions,
established in the Philippines before American occupation
and the way in which the United States came in control of
the Islands (2) to examine American political, social and
economic domination of the Islands, (3) to investigate
America's reaction to the independence struggle by the
Filipinos, (4) to suggest some of the problems of the
Commonwealth, (5) to examine two Philippine parties that
2
led the struggle for independence, (6) to inquire into
the reasons why America granted independence to the
Philippines.
Scope and Limitation.—This study will focus on
the Philippines struggle for independence and the role
that the United States played in liberating the Philip
pines. In dealing with this study many important factors
must be excluded. Moreover, this study is limited by the
unavailability of research material. Another limitation
is the period, 1934-1946.
Methods of Research.—The methods of research
utilized by the writer are four: historical, descriptive,
analytical, and comparative.
Procedure of Inquiry.—Chapter I is an introduction
to the study. Chapter II discusses the historical back
ground of the Philippine Islands, the Spanish occupation,
American occupation, birth of the Commonwealth, its prob
lems, Japanese occupation, recapture of the islands by
America, the Huk rebellion, and how it contributed to the
crippling of the Philippines. Chapter III presents an
inquiry into the nature of the struggle for independence,
organizations leading the struggle, the results of their
struggle, American reaction to the struggle, an analysis
of the Philippine Trade and Rehabilitation Act, the granting
3
of independence and why America granted the Philippines
its independence. Chapter IV discusses some of the
post-independent problems between these two countries.
The final chapter consists of the summary and con
clusions of this study.
Sources of Materials and Tools of Research.—The
bulk of material for this study came from the Trevor
Arnett Library, supplemented by the Atlanta Public Library
and the Alabama State College Library. Books, magazines,
and periodicals constitute the tools used in this study.
Significance of the Study.—This study may con
tribute to a better understanding of how and why America
became involved in the Philippines. It seeks to contribute
to an understanding of American colonial policies and their
effect upon a "backward" people in quest of independence.
The paper will also suggest reasons that cast doubts on
the wisdom of the United States becoming involved in the
Philippines under the circumstances. This study will sug
gest that the Filipinos were justified in their rebellion
against American sovereignty. The Filipinos contended that
they wanted freedom from America because they feared we
would and were doing the same thing as the Spanish—politi
cal and economic exploitation of the Islands, it seeks
to show problems faced by Philippine politicians prior to,
and after, independence and points out the domestic and
4
international hopes, obligations and problems that face
the Philippines.
Furthermore, in this study we put forth the ideas
about the prejudices and hostilities of America. The
Philippine culture was dominated by Spain for more than
300 years, then suddenly dominated by another civilization
that destroyed the roots of the old society and at the
same time made it extremely difficult for an entry into
the new.
The Philippines is important to America for three
paramount reasons; economic, strategic, and political.
The Islands supply America with certain raw materials and
foodstuffs. Strategically, it gives America a better
foothold for operations in Southeast Asia in order to try
and contain communism. Politically, the Philippines is
the showcase of democracy for America and it must contribute
whatever is necessary to preserve it and hope that other




The Philippines was discovered by Magellan in his
search for the spice islands. Brilliant and romantic as
is the story of that voyage, it brought no immediate reward
to Spain.
Portugal remained in her enjoyment of the Eastern
trade and nearly half a century elapsed before Spain ob
tained a settlement in the Islands. However, before any
settlements were made, Spain became engaged in a number of
long disputes with Portugal.1
After the discovery of the West Indies by Columbus,
upon request of the court of Spain, Pope Alexander VI
divided the new lands between Spain and Portugal. He de
clared that newly discovered countries to the west of a meri
dian 100 leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands
should be Spanish possessions.
A year later Spain agreed with Portugal to shift
David P. Barrows, History of the Philippines
(Chicago, 1924), p. 59.
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this line to the meridian 370 leagues west of Cape Verde
Islands. This division, carried on the same meridian
around the globe, resulted in giving India and Malaysia
to Portugal and all the New World, except Brazil, to
Spain.
The 180 degrees west of the ineridiaia finally
agreed upon extended to the western part of New Guinea,
and not quite to the Maluccas. Both parties were suf
fering from geographical ignorance and as a result both
parties claimed the Spice Islands. Portugal denied to
Spain all rights to the Philippines, and a conflict in
the Par East began.3
Spanish Occupation
The Philippine Islands constitute a compact archi
pelago of over 7,000 islands with a total area of nearly
116,000 square miles. The two largest islands, Luzon with
40,814 and Mindanao with 36,906 square miles, account for
67 percent of the total area of the archipelago, and the
eleven largest islands account for 95 percent of the total
land area. Over 6,500 of the islands have areas of less
2
Barrows, op. cit., p. 65.
3Ibid.
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than one square mile each.4 The islands are strategically
located about 200 miles south of Formosa and 700 miles east
of Indochina.
In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese navi
gator in the service of Spain, came upon the Islands while
on an expedition to circumnavigate the globe. The Islands
were claimed for Spain and named in honor of Prince Philip,
later Philip II. it was not until approximately half a
century after Magellan's discovery of the archipelago did
the Spanish make permanent settlement.5 Gradually Spanish
administration was extended over the archipelago, and
Spanish culture spread widely among the people.
As a result of the Spanish rule, Filipinos became
Christianized and the most westernized of the Asian peoples.
Islam had come to Mindanao and the Sulu islands about two
hundred years before the Spanish arrived, and the natives
remained Moslems. Spain was able to affiliate the others
with the Roman Catholic church.6
The Spanish did practically nothing to advance or
y Vondenbosch and Richard Butwell, Southeast
Asia Among the World Powers (Lexington, 1957), p. 70.
5Ibid., p. 71.
6Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast
Asia; 1945-1958 (New York, 1958), p. 80.
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train the Filipinos in self-government, and they indirectly
created the conditions which were bound to produce a nation
alist movement. Spain brought the people of the many
Islands under one administration, ruling with a firm hand,
and gave the upper classes a common language and the masses
a common religion, thus gradually welding the different
ethnic groups into a nation. Schools, housing, education,
sanitation, etc., were conducted on a very small scale and
were never adequate.
A revolt against Spanish rule broke out in 1896.
It was put down but resumed in 1899. The United States
government now found itself in the awkard position of
having to put down a movement for national independence.
The era, 1837-1897,was the last half century of
Spanish rule over the Philippines. This period was one
of social and economic progress. During it the Spanish
rulers had numerous plans for the developments and better
administration of the Philippines. This period was an
epoch marked by wonderful advancements despite the many
hardships experienced by both sides.8
7"Republic of the Philippines," Department of
State Bulletin. April, 1960, p. 1.
g
Barrow, op. cit., p. 223.
The opening of the port of Manila to foreign trade
in 1837 was followed by a period of rising industry and
prosperity. Up to this period the archipelago had not
been a country for producing export, but the freeing of
trade led to the raising of a great harvest for foreign
export, all for the benefit of Spain, however.
By 1858, the exportation of hemp had risen to
412,000 piculs or 27,500 tons, and of this amount nearly
two-thirds went to the United States.9 After 1814,
general permission had been given to foreigners to estab
lish trading houses in Manila, and by 1858 there were
fifteen establishments, of which seven were English and
three American.10
The political system maintained during this era
was one in which the Filipinos were in no way proud of.
It was so weak in terms of satisfying the inhabitants
that the Spanish regime was confronted with several up-
... 11
risings in protest to it.
In 1850 there were thirty-four provinces and two
9
Grayson L. Kirk, Philippine Independence (New York,
1936), p. 80.
10
Barrows, op. cit.. p. 234.
11
George A. Malcolm, The First Malayan Republic The
Story of the Philippines (Boston, 1951), p. 30.
10
politico-military commandancios. In these provinces the
Spanish administration was still vested solely in the mayor,
who, until after 1886, was governor, executive officer and
12
judge for trials of provincial cases and crimes.
American Occupation
"When America arrived in the Philippines, many
Filipinos were working for five and ten cents a day.
The prevailing rate of wages for common labor was about
twenty cents, except in the seaports and the largest
population centers, where it ran somewhat higher.
In view of these conditions, America immediately
began the task of changing the economic and social con
ditions. Under the inspiration of education and oppor
tunity these conditions slowly changed. Wages soon in
creased; in the cities laborers were shortly earning more
than a dollar per day, three or four times the amount
earned under Spanish domination.
America came into control of the Philippines through
a war with Spain, which grew out of a situation in Cuba.




poorly organized, poorly disciplined.
Spanish attempts to suppress the insurrection
were inefficient, cruel, and only partly successful. The
situation had long been developing.
In the month of April, 1898, war was declared be
tween Spain and the United States. On the first day of
May, an American fleet reached Manila harbor and in the
naval f ight off Cavite, Spanish dominion, which had lasted
with only one brief interruption for 333 years, was ended.15
With the passing of Spanish sovereignty to America, a new
era began in the Philippines.
The fact that America obtained its independence
by revolution caused Americans to give sympathy to the
cause of the revolutionists. The people of Cuba, who made
repeated but ineffective struggles against Spanish sovereign
ty, had the wishes of the American people.
When rebellion broke out afresh in Cuba in 1894,
the United States government suppressed the lending of
assistance to the Cubans; however, the American people
themselves wished to see Cuba free. The war in Cuba
14




Barrows, op. cit., p. 264.
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dragged along for many years and became more and more
merciless. Spain poured troops into the Island until
there were 120,000 on Cuban soil; however, the rebellion
continued.
As the contest proceeded without sign of termi
nation, the impatience of the American people grew. Then
on February 15, 1898, occurred an event which ended the
hopes of peaceful settlement. The American battleship
Maine, lying in the harbor of Havana, was destroyed and
226 American officers and sailors were killed. Congress
demanded that Spain withdraw from the island and recognize
the independence of Cuba. Spain refused, and resolved
"I Q
upon resistance. There is no evidence to tell which
side bombed the ship.
Here it is pertinent to mention why Spain refused
to surrender Cuba. America was in a stage of expansionism.
Congress on April 20, 1898, resolved thatr
It is the duty of the United States to
demand and the government of the United
States does hereby demand, that the
Catherine Porter, Crisis in the Philippines (New
York, 1942), p. 67.
18Porter, op. cit., p. 68.
19Ibid.
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government of Spain at once relinquish
its authority and government in the
island of Cuba and withdraw its land
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban
waters.
Furthermore, it directed and empowered the President
"to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States-
to such extent as may be necessary to enforce that
21
requirement."
The Congressional resolution gave Spain a three-day
ultimatum for compliance. America knew that Spain could
not and would not accept it. The Spaniards declared the
resolution equivalent to a declaration of war and broke
22
relations the same day.
There was nothing in the resolution to indicate
that Congress had any interest in any territory other than
Cuba or that the President was authorized to use the armed
forces for any purposes not directly related to the Spanish
withdrawal from Cuba.
In the meanwhile, the war began without the
slightest reference to the Philippines. At the opening of
the war, Spain and the United States had squadrons in Asiatic
20
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New




waters. The Spanish fleet lay at Cavite, the American
ships gathered at Hongkong.
Immediately on the declaration of war, the American
Naval commander, Dewey, was ordered to destroy the Spanish
fleet, which was felt to be on the Pacific Coast of America.
Dewey entered the Bay of Manila in darkness on the morning
of May 1, and proceeded directly to the Spanish vessels at
Cavite. In a few hours the Spanish fleet was utterly
destroyed.23
Only a few days later President McKinley authorized
preparations for the dispatch of an army of occupation. The
mission of this ground force was to follow up Dewey"s victory,
to complete "the reduction of Spanish power in that area,
and to give order and security to the Islands while in the
possession of the United States."24 This force arrived and
destroyed Manila.
The effect of this action, however, later con
stituted the most important and probably decisive considera
tion in America's final decision to take the islands away
from Spain and put them under our control. This military
operation shattered Spanish rule in the islands, and made
23Barrows, op. cit.. p. 266.
24Kennan, op. cit.. p. 17.
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it impossible for us to leave the Islands to Spain, and
it left the United States with no alternative but to take
the Islands.
When the United States completed negotiations with
Spain for the Islands, on January 4, 1899, McKinley declared
that American sovereignty must be recognized without con
dition. The Filipinos rebelled against American occupation.
In the interval between the destruction of the
Spanish fleet and the capture of Manila, the Filipinos in
Cavite organized a provisional government and proclaimed
the independence of the Philippines. This was on January 23,
1899, and Don Emilio Aguinaldo was elected President.
He immediately announced that the Islands were a
Republic and asked other foreign governments for recogni
tion. It must be remembered that America had declared her
sovereignty over the Islands on January 4, 1899. America
stated that the Filipinos were rebelling against her
sovereignty, and began immediately to put down the uprisings
which did not end until 1901. Many Americans and Filipinos
lost their lives in the uprising.^
The idea of returning the Islands to Spain was ex
ceedingly repugnant to American sentiment. Spain's attitude
26
Barrows, op. cit., p. 265.
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toward revolutionist was well understood in America, and
the Filipinos had acted as America's friend and ally.
On the other hand, the American government was
unwilling to turn over the newly-organized repbulic to
the Filipinos. America felt that this Filipino govern
ment was not yet representative of all the people in the
Philippines, Moreover, America felt that the people
themselves had not been exposed to political training and
experience, at least not in the American tradition.27
The U. S., having overthrown the Spanish govern
ment of the islands, was under obligation to see that
the government established in its place would represent
all and do injustice to none. America decided it was
best not to recognize the new government.
Now, if there was no justification for the action
against the Philippines in the origin of the war with
Spain, what were the motives that lay behind it? Down to
this present day we do not know the full answer to this
question. We know a number of things about it, however.
President McKinley asserted on November 21, 1899s
The truth is I didn't want the Philippines,
and when they came to us, as a gift from
the Gods, I did not know what to do with
them. When the war broke out, Dewey was in
27Ibid.
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Hongkong and I ordered him to go to
Manila and to capture and destroy
the Spanish fleet, and he had to; be
cause... if the Dons were victorious
they would likely cross the Pacific
to ravage our Oregon and California
coasts....
When next I realized that the Philip
pines had dropped into our laps I con
fess that I did not know what to do
with them. I sought counsel from all
sides—Democrats as well as Republicans—
but got little help. I thought first we
would take only Manila; then Luzon; then
other islands, perhaps, also. I walked
the floor of the White House night after
night until midnight, and I am not ashamed
to tell you...that I went down on my knees
and prayed to Almighty God for light and
guidance more than one night. And one
night late it came to me this wayr
(1) that we could not give them back to
Spain—that would be cowardly and dis
honorable, (2) that we could not turn
them over to Prance or Germany—our com
mercial rivals in the Orient—that would
be bad business and discreditable, (3)
that we could not leave them to them
selves—they were unfit for self-govern
ment and would soon have anarchy and
misrule over there worse than Spain's
was, and (4) there was nothing left for
us to do but to take them all and educate
the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize
them, and by God's grace do the best we
could for them, as our fellowmen for whom
Christ also died. And I went to bed, and
to sleep, and slept soundly,and the next
morning I sent for the Chief engineer of
the War Department (our map maker), and
I told him to put the Philippines on the
map of the United States, and there they
are and there they will stay while I am
President. °
28
- Garel A. Grunder and William Livezey, The Philip
pines and the United States (Tu 1 s aa, 1951), p. 36.
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This explanation is interesting. In it one finds
no premediated empire-planning, no expression for a naval
base, and no allusion to hemp, sugar or mineral resources.
According to Kennan, McKinley was not originally
a policy man, but he was susceptible to influence and
responsible to party interests. It took five months for
him to decide to take the whole Island instead of a part
of the archipelago. ^
In view of the pressures, pro and con, and in
light of the spirit of the times, a solution for the
Philippines problem was far from simple. In fact, McKinley
once remarked, "if old Dewey had just sailed away when he
smashed that Spanish fleet, what a lot of trouble he would
have saved us."30
Many Americans were against McKinley"s action.
Senator Hoar stateds
I claim that under the Declaration of
Independence you can not govern a
foreign territory, a foreign people,
another people than your own, that you
cannot subjugate them or govern them
against their will, because you think
you are going to give them the blessing
of liberty. You have no right at the
29
Kennan, op. cit., p. 19.
30,'Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 36.
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Cannon's mouth to impose on an un
willing people your declaration of
independence and your constitution
and your notions of freedom and
notions of what is good.31
Many opinions were given. None, however, changed
America's course in its early stage.
Kennan thinks that when it came to the employment
of our armed forces, popular moods, political pressures,
32
and inner governmental intrigue were decisive. Per
haps McKinley did not want war but when the bitter
realities were upon him, there is no indication that
either he or his Secretary of State felt bound to oppose
the resort to war if this was advantageous to them from
the standpoint of domestic politics.
Spain ceded the islands to the United States
under the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1898), which
ended the Spanish-American war. America finally demanded
of Spain that she accept the sum of $20,000,000 in gold,
for public works and improvements which she had made.
31Ibid.
Kennan, op. cit., p. 18.
33Ibid., p. 19.
3^Grayson L. Kirk, Philippine Independence (New
York, 1936), p. 79.
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The United States put down the insurrection and in
1901 Aquinaldo was captured and swore allegiance to
the United States. This state of hostilities is referred
to as the Philippine-American war 1899-1902.
The U. S. inflicted severe punishment on those
who rebelled against her sovereignty over the islands. In
November, 1900, a much more vigorous policy of war was
inaugurated. General MacArthur had several thousands of
Filipinos arrested and imprisoned. These measures, pursued
through the winter of 1900-01, broke the fighting strength
of the revolutionists.
The interval between the occupation of Manila on
August 13, 1898, and the ratification of the Peace Treaty
on February 6, 1899, was one of befuddlement. At this
point the ultimate disposition of the islands was uncertain.
There is no doubt that the considerable delay in
negotiating and ratifying the Treaty was unfortunate. Had
the United States been able to proceed on August 13, or
thereabouts with some concrete plan of the islands ad
ministration, the subsequent collision with the insurgents
might possibly have been avoided.
35Kirk, op. cit., p. 79
36Ibid., p. 40.
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To supplement the efforts of the army in winning
the Filipinos to a recognition of American rule and to
reorganize the political institutions of the islands,
President McKinley, in April of 1900, appointed the first
Philippine Commission, and its President was William H, Taft.
This Commission was able to bring about an understanding
with Filipino leaders and assure them of the honorable pur-
37
pose of American occupation.
This document, after defining the very large re
sponsibilities which Taft was to assume, enumerated that
the Commission was to follow a liberal policy, create a
system of government in which the Filipino himself would
have the largest possible share, establish a civil service
upon a merit basis, and particularly to extend to the local
units of government the largest possible degree of self
op
autonomy. °
From 1903-1913, the Republican party was in power
and the policy originally outlined by President McKinley
continued to be the guiding principle of the U. S. in ad
ministering the government of the Islands ,39
3Catherine Porter, Crisis in the Philippines, op.
cit., p. 74.
38ibid.
39Barrow, op. cit., p. 261.
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In 1914, the Democratic Party came into power.
The Eemocrats had promised in earlier elections to grant
the Philippines independence. Once again in power, the
Democrats were committed to granting independence. In
1916, the Democrats began the task of drawing up legislation
to fulfill that promise. They enacted the "Jones Bill."
The measure underwent many changes.
This amendment, as first introduced, was not ap
proved. Later a preamble was added to the Jones Act which
states the purpose of the United States being in the Philip
pines. The preamble also stated that America would &&&&&&
its sovereignty from over the island and recognize its
independence as soon as a stable government could be estab
lished therein. ^
The law was finally enacted, and as accepted by both
Houses of Congress and by the Philippine Commission, this
law changed considerably the government of the Philippines.
The Philippine Commission was abolished. As a legislative
body its place was taken by a "Philippine Senate" composed
of 24 members, of whom 22 were elected by senatorial districts




Bill, in its final form, provided the Philippines with a
republican form of government as America has.
The passage of the Jones Act momentarily arrested
the movement for independence in the Philippines. The
promise of the preamble to recognize independence as soon
as a stable government could be established is somewhat
difficult to interpret because of the definition of stable
government.
Williams thinks and stated that the stability of
no government can be perpetually guaranteed or completely
assured and that the Philippines in 1916 contained as much
assurance of stability as the governments of most new states
when accorded international recognition. 2
Immediately upon conclusion of the Armistice, the
Philippine legislature established an independence mission
to proceed to the United States in 1919. President
Wilson was in Paris representing the United States at a
peace conference. He sent this messages
I think I express the prevailing feeling
in the United States when I say that the
time has substantially come, if not quite
come, when the Philippine Island can be
42D. R. Williams, The United States and the Philip
pines (New York, 1925), p. 201.
43Ibid.
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allowed to sever the mere formal politi
cal tie remaining and become an independent
people.^
The mission was heard by a committee of Congress,
which was adverse to immediate action. The mission returned
home without obtaining a settlement of the issue.
The Democratic party was defeated in 1920, and
Warren G. Harding, the Republican nominee, became Presi
dent. The Philippines had received scant attention during
the war. President Harding was not satisfied with conditions
when he became President in regard to independence for the
Philippines. Before making recommendation to Congress he
ordered a fresh examination of the Islands. He, accord
ingly, constituted a mission composed of Leonard Wood and
45
W. Cameron Forbes to visit the Islands.
For four months it devoted itself to investigations.
In some respects, however, conditions were far from satis
factory. The courts were behind in their trial of cases
and there were numerous complaints as to the administration
of justice.
It was, however, in financial affairs that the
mission found most to criticize. The treasury was bank
rupted. Government expenses were in excess of income and
^Barrows, op. cit., p. 368.
45catherine Porter, Philippines Emergency(New York,
1941), p. 47.
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financial bankruptcy was imminent, unless the immediate
assistance of foreign capital was obtained.
The Wood-Forbes report persuaded the President
not to recommend to Congress immediate independence.
President Harding induced Wood to accept the post of
Governor-General of the Philippines.
Wood gave his immediate attention to correcting
the deficiencies which the report of the mission dis
closed and particularly to improving conditions of health
and sanitation, securing more hospitals, providing better
care for defectives, insane, etc. Above all, his attention
was devoted to bringing government finances into order and
saving the financial credit.
On July 17, 1923, the Filipino members of the
Council of State resigned as a body and commenced a series
of strong protests against the Philippine governor and the
President of the United States. Nationalism was gaining
strength repidly. The people wanted American sovereignty
removed from over their country.
The Filipino members of the Council of State
resigned because, in their view, Wood was exercising too
Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, Southeast
Asia Among the World Powers (Lexington, 1957), p. 75.
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much power, which according to the Jones Act he did not
have.47
On October 11, 1923, a telegram was sent by the
Secretary of War to the Governor, which stated the Presi
dent's volition to be:
That Congress, after full consideration,
had vested the authority of control and
the supervision of all departments and
bureaus in the Governor; that these of
ficials were directly responsible to the
Governor and not to the legislature...
powers of the Governor have not been mis
used. ..if the legislature had enacted
legislation violative of the provisions
of 1916, such legislation was to that
extent null and void.48
In view of the President's decision,, the Filipino
leaders and parties in opposition to the Governor re
doubled their efforts to secure from Congress new legisla
tion, according either complete autonomy to the Philip
pines or the independence of the Islands.49
The crisis which had developed under Wood ended
with his death in 1927 and the appointment in 1928 of
See David P. Barrows, History of The Philippines
(Chicago, 1924), p. 386, for a complete discussion of the




Henry L. Stimson who succeeded in restoring good relations
with the political leaders and in reestablishing much of
the authority of the office. His successors, Dwight Davis
(1929-1931) and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., (1931-1933),
continued the Stimson policies.50
During these years the Filipino leaders exerted con
tinuous pressure for independence. Mission after mission
was sent to Washington requesting it. In reply to comments
in the United States that the Filipinos did not want in
dependence, the insular legislature in 1927 passed a bill
over Wood's veto providing for a plebiscite which would
enable the people of the Islands to demonstrate their de
sire for national freedom. The measure was disapproved
by President Coolidge.51
The independence issue entered a new phase with
the Depression. Heretofore, the Filipinos ardently
pressed the issue upon a reluctant Washington, but, after
1930, the American Congress was determined to sever the
colonial relationship with the Philippines on terms which
the Filipinos were sure to accept.52
50Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, op. cit.
p. 75.
Manuel L. Quezon and Camilo Osias, Governor-
General Wood and the Filipino Cause (Manila, 1928), pp. 173-174,
S2Army Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, op. cit., p. 76.
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Congress, on January 17, 1933, passed the Hare-
Hawes-Cutting Act over President Hoover's veto. However,
the law was not to become effective until accepted by the
Philippine Legislature, but this body, under the influence
of Senator Quezon, rejected it.
It was rejected because of the absence of economic
protection. The second independence Act, the Tydings-
McDuffie Act, passed by the American Congress in 1934,
differed little from its predecessor. This Act was finally
accepted by the Philippines after a special promise by Presi
dent Roosevelt that regulations to modify the economic ef
fects of the act would be considered before full independence
materialized. However, Quezon had to accept because he
could not get anything better.
Later History
Birth of the Commonwealth
On November 15, 1935, the Philippines entered a ten-
year period of semi-autonomy under a Commonwealth form of
government, as provided by the Tydings-McDuffie Act, to
end in July, 1946. This was the year that the Philippines
53 Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippine: A Study in
National Development (New York, 1947), p. 789.
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could become an independent nation.54
Prior to this, however, the people of the Philip
pines ratified the new constitution in May, 1935, and
elected officials of their new government in September.
In November the Commonwealth government of the Philippines
was inaugurated.
During the Commonwealth period of ten years,
foreign relations remained under the control of the
United States government. Instead of the Governor-General,
a office of High Commission was established.55
Free trade between the two countries was continued
for the first five years, but beginning with the sixth
year the Philippine government was to pay an export tax
of 5 percent "of the rates of duty which are required by
the laws of the United States to be levied,collected, and
paid on articles from foreign countries."
The rate was to be increased by an additional 5
per cent each year, and with the termination of American
54
Porter, Crisis in the Philippines, op. cit.,
p. 11. "~ "
55Franz H, Michael and George E. Taylor, The Far
East in the Modern World (New York, 1956), p. 560.
56Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, op. cit.,
p. 77.
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sovereignty the United States would levy the same import
duties that it levied on goods coming from other countries.
For the purpose of the regulation of immigration
the Philippines was immediately regarded as a foreign coun
try and was granted a quota of 50 immigrants a year.58
The Constitution which the Filipinos adopted was
basically the United States' Constitution. Changes have
been made only as reformers have deemed them necessary.
With only a few minor changes, this is the Constitution
which governs the Philippines today.
The economic foundation was sorely inadequate, and
it showed up on the eve of independence.59 In other words,
while the United States was, on one hand, promising inde
pendence and taking steps toward the attainment of that
objective by legislative enactments and by training the
Filipinos in the ideals of self-government, it was, on the
other hand, pursuing a trade policy which had the effect
of binding the two countries economically closer.
Problems of the Commonwealth
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adequate food, education, medical facilities, etc. the
Commonwealth was suffering from a poor agricultural sys
tem, national defense, and a lagging administration.
The physical transition to the Commonwealth took
place with barely any difficulty. Soon afterwards, how
ever, certain problems arose which the Commonwealth had
to meet and try to solve. The economy had to be regu
lated to comply with the McDuffie Act, which was ex
tremely difficult.60
President Quezon made national defense the first
order of business. The first measure to be enacted by
the new legislature dealt with national defense. The
Defense Act provided for an annual draft of 40,000 men.
They were to receive five and a half months training,
after which they would go into a citizen reserve, and
be recalled at the end of five years for refresher
courses.
The draft functioned well, but did not reach the
goal set at any point. There were several reasons for
this. Physical facilities were inadequate. There were
also critical shortages of trained officers and non
commissioned officers to carry the load for training the
60Robert A. Smith, Philippine Independence, 1946-
1958 (New York, 1958), p. 103.
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recruits. A poor defense system opened the way for
Japanese occupation.^
Next, the Commonwealth sought to make certain
reforms in the administration of justice. The National
Assembly provided for the reorganization of the Supreme
Court and the establishment of circuit courts of
appeals.
According to Quezon "there are few things that
would contribute more to the stability of the Philip
pine government than a conviction among the masses of
its citizens that they are living under just laws fairly
and competently administered.ll62
By no means, however, were these the only prob
lems. They are merely some of the major ones.
Japanese Occupation
The defense of the Philippine Commonwealth
against the Japanese attack in 1941 was still an
American responsibility. Japanese aggression in
Manchuria in 1931-32 had caused Americans grave concern
61Ibid.
62
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over the possibility of war in the Far East.
Japan continued its aggression—finally oc
cupying Indochina in 1940. Americans and Filipinos
became alarmed. MacArthur was persuaded by President
Quezon to come to the Philippines and build its
defense.63
President Quezon argued that so long as sover
eignty over the Islands remained with the United States,
and exclusive control over its foreign policy, ac
countability for any war in which the Philippines might
become involved would rest with the United States.64
America's sovereignty over the Islands ended
momentarily when the Japanese defeated Americans and
Filipinos at Corregidor on May 6, 1942. President
Quezon, Vice-President OSmena, and several members of
the cabinet made their way by submarine to various parts
of the Philippines and eventually to Washington with
MacArthur, leaving behind other members of the govern
ment to deal with the invader.
The Japanese moved into Manila, declared it an
open city on January 2, 1942, and immediately announced




that the United States' sovereignty over the Philippines
had come to an end. Quezon immediately denounced it.65
The Japanese chose to ignore the fact that the
Philippines was at war with her^ Japan insisted that she
had come to free fellow oriental from Western domination
and could rightfully claim their cooperation.
Any Filipinos refusing to serve in the Japanese
created puppet regime was treated by the Japanese as
traitors and could be shot. After the Japanese executed
Chief Justice Jose Santos on May 7, 1942, for refusing
to serve under them, very few Filipino leaders declined
to take office.66
The Japanese moved quickly to disestablish all
political parties. As a replacement they set up an
organization known as the Kalibapi. They forced all
government officials and practically every other exist
ing organization into the Kalibapi. The next step was
to grant to the Filipinos their independence, and a
republic was inaugurated on October 14, 1943, with
65"Philippine Fight for Freedom: Quezon Denounce
False Independence Declared by Japanese Invaders*"
Scholastic. November 15, 1943, pp. 6-8.
66George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United
States? Problems of Partnership (New York, 1964), p. 97.
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Jose Laurel as President.^7
When the Japanese conferred independence on
the Philippines they made it a member of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was theoretically
an association of independent states with Japan as the
leader.68
The republic was recognized by the Axis powers
and Japanese satellites; it even asked for American
recognition.03 in September 1944, the Japanese forced
the Philippines to agree to the final indignity of de
claring a state of war against the United States and
Great Britain.
By this time it was quite clear that the masses
of Filipino were completely alienated from the govern
ment and would welcome Americans back, because the
puppet regime was of no value whatsoever to them.70
Some leaders, however, were pleased with Japanese
occupation as expressed by Jurge B. Vargas, former
secretary to President Quezon and later ambassador of
the puppet government to Japans






We were in hopeless bondage...and Japan
liberated us. We were deluded victims
and Japan redeemed us. We were divided
by political dissensions, weakened by
imitations and frivolity, deluded by a
sense of inferiority and Japan re
deemed us.71
General Aquinaldo, an old revolutionary leader,
who in all the years after his surrender had been friendly
toward the United States, saw:
All troublesome doubts dispelled by
the light of Japan's rising sun, by
those rays we have found the central
fact of our national existence, the
eternal truth which eluded us, but
to which our national soul was anchored
from the beginning, namely, that we are
Orientals and that is our God-given duty
to do our part as members of that proud
race.'*
The Japanese made desperate efforts to organize
Filipinos to cooperate with them. There was a growing
guerrilla resistance in the Philippines against the
Japanese. Most of the guerrillas, however, were tenant
farmers, and their organization represented, therefore,
not only a fight against Japan but also a defense of the
farmers' economic interest, which had been further en
dangered by Japanese occupation.'^




The largest such organization on the island of
Luzon became known as the Hukbalahap, an abbreviation
of a larger name meaning Anti-Japanese Resistance
Society. The Huks, as they were called, received
American equipment and were, like other guerrilla
forces, in contact with the American army before the
liberation of the Philippines. ^
But their organization was controlled by leaders
such as Luis Tarul, who was later revealed to be a Moscow-
trained communist. The Japanese occupation thus resulted
in the organizing and arming of the discontented peasant
farmers as a part of the guerrila resistance. However,
the fateful consequence was that the largest such organi
zation, the Huks, fell into the hands of communist leaders;
who after the end of the war continued to exploit tenant
discontent for their own aim of gaining political power.75
In the meantime, through General MacArthur's
headquarters established in Brisbane, MacArthur maintained
contact with guerrilla action. President Quezon while in
exile in America, signed the United Nations Declaration,
sat on the Pacific War Council. Unfortunately, he died
75ibid., p. 565.
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in exile before his country was liberated from Japan.
He was succeeded as President by Vice-President Osmena. On
February 27, 1945, American sovereignty was restored
to the Islands.76
When American sovereignty came to an end in
1946, all Japanese national, military and civilians,
were repatriated, and Japanese assets taken over by the
Philippines. Diplomatic relations between the Philip
pines and Japan were not restored until after the sign
ing of a treaty of peace in 1952. '
On February 27, 1945, President Osmena received
from MacArthur complete control of the civil government
of the Philippines. °
The Huk Rebellion
During this period the Philippines was gravely
menaced by the Huk guerrilla movement. Officially or
ganized in central Luzon in 1942 with communist backing
as the Hukbalahap or Peoples Army to Fight Japan.
After the Japanese capitulation the Huk movement
76Howard M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in
Modern Times (New York, 1959), p. 804.
77Ibid.
7^"Self-Rule is Restored to the Philippines,"
Christian Century, March 14, 1945, p. 324.
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did not terminate but instead was converted to a war
against landlords. Huk bands committed numerous
crimes and practiced exhortation and intimidation on a
frightened people. President Roxas in 1946 and President
Quirino in 1948 had been unsuccessful in attempts to
negotiate with the Huks# offering amnesty in exchange for
79
the surrender of their arms.
A cleavage between the hard core of the Huk
leadership and the rank and file of the peasant member
ship began to appear in 1946. The rank and file wanted
to become eligible for the back pay which the United
80
States was alloting to other guerrillas.
The hard core leadership was more skeptical and
decreed open hostilities against Roxas. In their
opinion, he had a dubious war record, and was a thorough-
81
going tool of the capitalists. The Huk leaders adopted
a program which went far beyond the requirements of
agrarian reform. They came out against the Trade Act
and independence which had been obtained from the U. S.
™Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Com
munism (Los Angeles, 1955), p. 60.
^Shirley Jenkins, American Economic Policy Toward
the Philippines (Los Angeles, 1954), p. 6.
81Ibid.
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For an agricultural program, they advocated a
"70-30" division of the crops between tenant and land
lord, redistribution of large estates, crop loans for
small farmers, tax relief, government financed tractors
and experimental stations, extension of co-operatives,
aid for construction of homes and a beginning of
collectivation.82
In April, 1948, when Quirino succeeded to the
Presidency, he tried new tactics, truce negotiations,
and amnesty. He permitted the Huk representatives to
take their seats in Congress. Luis Tarul, their leader,
came to Manila and promised to have his men surrender
their arms. Fifty days were accorded for turning in
arms, but only one hundred Huks registered and less
than fifty actually gave up their guns.
In 1949, the movement changed its name to
Hukboncr Mapaqpalaya Nq Bavan or people's Liberation Army.
Its leaders stated that their objective was to overthrow
the government and establish a communist regime. The
movement spread rapidly, and by 1950 the Huks boasted
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At this juncture President Quirino, realizing
how pathetic conditions were becoming, appointed Raman
Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense and made him responsible
for operations against the Huks. Prior to his appoint
ment, the constabulary was used against the Huks.
Magsaysay reorganized and strengthened the army and
used it to fight the Huks.
Guerrilla tactics were developed for penetration
of areas under Huk control. Rewards were offered for
capture, or information leading to the capture of
principal leaders. Thus, the war was carried on to
the enemy.
On the other hand, amnesty and resettlement,
as well as protection, were promised to those other
than leaders who surrendered. These tactics, which con
tinued to be employed, yielded results. By 1958, the
only Huk leader still at large was Jesus Lava; the most
of his fellowers had surrendered.
Magsaysay defeated the Huks by making various
promised to them, with effective military and police
drives against the core of communist Huk leadership.
Eventually the movement disintegrated.00 Today it has
virtually disappeared.
°^Vinacke, op. cit., p. 813.
86Ibid.
CHAPTER III
THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
Nationalism is, among other things, the feeling of
a people that they are by right a nation and ought to have
their own sovereignty.1 People feel oppressed if some other
nation rules them. So it was with the Filipinos.
Perhaps every nation, like every individual, wants
to be free, and when a country is denied the basic rights of
self-rule, conflict develops.
The Philippines is a nation that has been under the
control of an imperalist power. Nationalism was very
strong under Spanish rule and several revolts occurred
against colonial rule. However, the oppressor had the force
to keep control.
National consciousness, a composite of many differ
ent attitudes and values, is one of the most essential
ingredients in the making of a nation. Without it there
can be no effective nationalism and without effective
David Cushman Coyle, The United Nations and How
it Works (New York, 1962), p. 131.
42
43
there cannot be a successful Philippine Republic. It is
no easy task to determine the nature of nationalism in the
Philippines, for the national consciousness of the Filipino
took shape under conditions without parallel in the modern
world.
During the Philippine struggle for independence,
many political parties were formulated and their immediate
objective was independence. Some of the parties were only
in existence for a very short period of time. Furthermore,
the parties were dominated with internal struggle and fights;
consequently they were short-lived.1
The Nacionalista party was founded in 1907, and was
the paramount party leading the struggle for independence.
This party was met with opposition from the many minor
parties that came into existence. However, the Nacionalista
party was always able to defeat its opponents and maintain
a position of leadership up to this date. The reasons for
this will be discussed later.
The writer has selected two parties that had a pro-
2
George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United
States Problems of Partnership (New York, 1964), p. 86.
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found hand in the struggle for independence: the
Nacionalista and the Sakdal parties. These are by no means
the only parties that participated in the struggle. They
played the protest role in the struggle for independence.
The Nacionalista Party
The Nacionalista party was founded in 1907. This
party is still dominant. Shortly after the party was
founded, it began the task of trying to pass legislation to
gain independence from America. There was a great deal of
internal fighting in the party. The party split into
various factions and opposed the Nacionalista party. But
due to the caliber of leadership of the Nacionalista party,
it was able to maintain its position of leadership.
Representatives of the party made many trips to America
to discuss the granting of independence. However, America
was determined not to grant independence until certain
conditions were satisfied. Realizing this, they did not
resort to violence as the Sakdal did. The party members
continued to make trips and appeals to America for indepen
dence. However, we did not grant independence until we felt
that the time was ripe.
3 Ibid.
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With the creation of the Philippine Assembly
in 1907 came the Nacionalista party. There were not any
outstanding accomplishments by the party in regard to in
dependence, save it merely kept the issue before Congress,
and was the dominant party when the Philippines was
inaugurated as a commonwealth and when it received indepen
dence.
It is relevant here to make note of why the
Nacionalista party has been able to survive to this day.
From 1907 on, the Nacionalista party virtually monopolized
political power and the fruits thereof. There are several
reasons why this party has maintained its dominance for more
than a half century.
Firstly, and foremost, it seized and skillfully
exploited the issue of national independence. Secondly, it
contained most of the national leaders of first-rate ability.
Thirdly, it entered into constructive partnership with the
American government, thus being in a position to claim a
share of the credit for the remarkable achievements of that
period. Fourthly, it enjoyed the political advantages that
are the fruits of long continued control of government, access
to 90 per cent of the political funds and superior prestige.
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Fifthly, because of the peculiar situation in the
Philippines, opponents of the majority party lacked those
issues upon which real vital opposition parties are usually
built.4
Under such conditions it is not surprising that no
Philippine minority party has ever turned itself into the
majority. As the years passed, President Quezon and his
followers developed great skill in absorbing opposition
groups.
The Sakdal Movement
The Sakdal party lost much of its political signifi
cance after 1935 when its attempt to overthrow the common
wealth government on the eve of its inauguration failed.
When the Sakdal party was founded in 1925, its
primary objective was immediate and complete independence.
Consequently, it was not in favor of a Commonwealth for a
ten-year span.
The attempt by the Sakdals to overthrow the Common
wealth on the eve of its inauguration and declare the
Philippines' independence resulted in a bloody massacre.
4
Hayden, op. cit.. p. 376.
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As the Sakdals attempted to overthrow the government, they
were met by opposition from the people who were in agreement
for the ten-year Commonwealth period. The Sakdal was a
minority party and was against great odds and suffered
5
defeat.
Despite the fact that the uprising was put down by
soldiers, many persons lost their lives. This uprising did
not change conditions for inauguration the Commonwealth.
The leader of the Sakdals, Benigno Ramos, took
refuge in Japan. He was finally brought to trial with other
prominent Sakdalists and jailed for participating in the
uprising.
The party was composed of peasants. In addition to
struggling for immediate and complete independence, the party
platform included cleaning up local politics, revising
taxation systems, and solving the tenancy problems.
The party was defeated not because it was a minority
party, but more importantly, because it opposed the most
Shirley Jenkins, The Philippines in Codv: The
Development of Selfrule and Independence in Burma. Malaya




powerful party in the Philippines — the Nacionalista
party.
The revolt may possibly have been avoided had
administrators tried to improve conditions of the peasants.
At the time the party was defeated, it was estimated that
it had more than 68,000 members.
Fundamentally, the uprising of May 2 and 3, 1935,
was due to political factors of long standing. Filipino
leaders advocated immediate independence for more than
thirty years. The Sakdals believed that immediate indepen
dence would be delayed and perhaps permanently lost by the
establishment of the Commonwealth government, and many were
in opposition to the Constitution.8
Moreover, the rebellion was caused partly by the
failure of the government to adequately explain the Constitu
tion to the peasants. They were swayed, however, by their
radical leaders, who told them that the Constitution would
deprive them of their rights as free citizens, and that no
7





effort was being made to acquaint them with its contents.
Many of the rank and file believed, too, that with
the coming of independence they would be better off economi
cally and socially — that the country would be governed
for their benefit instead of for the upper classes.
After the uprising, many were asked why they joined
in the uprising. On the whole, the answers followed
basically the same pattern.
The chief told me to come into town and
help capture the city. When we capture
it we would have independence.
. . . Under independence I believe that
we would have better business and better
harvest because it would be our ^
I oppose the Constitution because we want
independence. It is a good thing because
living will be made easier under independence.
The statements quoted are typical of the attitude








forty years, had been represented to them as*synonymous with
national honor and personal happiness.
The Sakdal movement had one overriding tone,
"independence." The movement, regardless of the reasons for
it, let the American people know that they had rights and
were willing to die for them. The patriotism shown by these
Filipinos will long be remembered by Americans.
American Reaction to the Independence Movement
When Spain was exercising sovereignty over Cuba,
Americans, on the whole, had a great deal of admiration for
the Cubans in their struggle for independence. In fact,
most Americans were elated to intervene and help liberate
Cuba, since we were at one time suffering from the same
dilemma.
However, when America came in control of the
Philippines and became the oppressor and exploiter, things
changed. On the whole we were not inclined to free the
Philippines until certain conditions were met.
America was in an era of the "White man's burden"
and felt that it was her duty to control and prepare people
of so-called backward countries in the American tradition.
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When America gained control of the Philippines, the theory
14
was put to the test.
As the Philippines continued to develop under the
auspices of America, her attitude continued to change in
regard to granting independence to the Filipinos. In order
to get a better understanding of America's reaction, it is
necessary to begin by examining briefly the Wood-Forbes
report of 1921, which was presented after the two men visit
ed the Islands to determine whether or not it was ready for
independence.
We find that the government is not reasonably
free from those underlying causes which result
in the destruction of government . . . the
people are not organized economically nor
from the standpoint of national defense to
maintain an independent government . . . with
all their excellent qualities, the experience
of the past eight years, during which they
have had practical autonomy, has not been such
as to justify the people of the United States
relinquishing supervision of the government
of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing their
army, and navy, and leaving the islands a prey
to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil
and potential commercial advantages. In con
clusion, we are convinced that it would be a
betrayal of the Philippine people a distinct
step backward in the path of progress, and a
14
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discreditable neglect of our national duty
were we to withdraw from the islands and
terminate our relationship there without
giving the Filipinos the best chance possible
to have an orderly and permanently stable
government. -^
This report persuaded President Harding not to
recommend to Congress immediate independence. Just prior
to the ending of Wilson's term in office, he had stated:
I think I express the prevailing feeling
in the United States when I say the time
has substantially come, if not quite come,
when the Philippine Islands can be allowed
to sever the mere formal political tie
remaining and become independent people.16
In December, 1926, President Harding had this to
say about granting independence:
The economic development of the Philippine
Islands is very important. They ought not
to be turned back to the people until they
are both politically fitted for self-govern
ment and economically independent.
Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines: Past and Present
(New York, 1930), pp. 753-754.
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In 1924, the Republican platform was in favor of a
continuation of the existing policy in the Philippine
Islands. The Democratic platform contained almost the
exact words of President Wilson in 1920 recommending to
Congress an immediate grant of independence.
The Republican platform of 1928 did not mention
independence for the Philippines, and the Democratic plat-
18
form repeated its Philippine plank of 1924.
There is one crucial element to bear in mind con
cerning the Republicans and Democrats. Until 1920, there
was no essential difference between their planks, so far as
immediate administrative action was concerned toward
Philippine independence.
The matter of giving independence to the Philippines
was repeatedly before Congress. It is pertinent to mention
a few significant instances indicative of the attitude of
Congress on the subject of Philippine independence.
In 1907, the United States Senate voted 39 to 18
against a proposed measure providing that independence





Congressman William A. Jones, in 1911, became
chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs. In 1912,
the Committee reported favorably on his Philippine bill,
providing for full and complete independence in 1921, but
19
the bill was not voted upon by the House.
In 1961, the Clarke amendment to the Jones Bill passed
the Senate, providing for complete independence in not less
than two years and not more than four years.
The amendment was defeated in the House by a vote of
213 to 165, and the bill enacted in its preamble "as soon
as a stable government can be established therein, indepen
dence will be granted."
The Jones Bill of 1961 reorganized the government of the
Philippine Islands on a basis of greatly extended autonomy.
The Clarke amendment proposal to this bill, provided for
complete independence at the end of not less than two and
not more than four years from the date of the approval of
the act. However, the amendment was not passed. Let us now
suggest something of America's reaction to this particular
amendment. The New York Evening Sun said:
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The passage of an act of Congress commit-
ing the United States to the evacuation
of the Philippines in two years or four
at any specific time in the near future
would be a criminal blunder.19
There was a strong feeling that if we did not rule
the Islands,Japan would. The Boston Transcript said:
After America, Japan. That is what would
inevitably be the disposition of the
Philippines if the present scheme for
scuttling were fulfilled.20
Lindley Garrison, Secretary of War, wrote to
President Wilson:
I consider the principle embodied in the
Clarke amendment of the duty of this
nation and a breach of trust toward the
Filipinos; so believing, I cannot accept
it or acquiesce in its acceptance. 1
Garrison resigned when President Wilson failed to stand with
him squarely on the issue. Wilson felt that the time was
due to grant independence.
The New York Times commented:
The bill should be laid aside. It is not
to the interest of our wards in the Pacific,
whom we have undertaken to develop in the
19






arts of civilization that it should
become a law .... The sentiment
of this country is strongly opposed
to it.22
True, indeed, it is most difficult, if not impossible, to
get an accurate picture of America's reaction to the move
ment.
In view of the President's decision not to grant
independence, the Filipino leaders redoubled their efforts
to secure from Congress new legislation, according either
complete autonomy to the Philippines or the independence of
the Islands.
We must bear in mind that there was no identification
of the Philippines with the Far Eastern policy of the United
States prior to 1898. American interests in the Philippines
was an afterthought. First came the battle of Manila, then
predictions and rationalization as to the value of the
23
Islands to America strategically and economxcally.
Philippine Trade Act of 1946
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Philippines and the United States are regulated by the
Philippine Trade Act of 1946, which went into effect on
24
April 30 of that year.
The Act provided for free reciprocal trade until
July 3, 1954, followed by increasing duties (five per cent)
until July 3, 1974, and then full rates are to become effec
tive. However, seven of the Philippines most important
exports were subject to quotas. The Act set quota for
twenty-eight years on exports to America of sugar, cordage,
rice, cigars, scrap and filler tobacco, coconot oil, and
pearl buttons.
The Act also contained the "parity" clause which
guaranteed to nationals of the United States the right to
exploit the natural resources of the Islands and to operate
25
utilities on equal terms with Filipinos.
The third restrictive provision tied the peso to the
dollar. Without the agreement of the President of the United
States, the government of the Philippines could not change
24
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the value of its currency in relation to the dollar, nor
suspend the convertibility of peso into dollars, nor impose
restrictions on the transfer of funds from the Philippines
to the United States.26
Now, the "parity clause" was a high price to pay
for the hope of American investments and caused special
difficulties; for it was in conflict with a provision of
the Philippine Constitution which restricted the exploita
tion of natural resources to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations of which at least 60 per cent of the capital
was owned by Filipinos.
There was sharp criticism of the Trade Act as being
"non-reciprocal" and one-sided. The Nacionalista party
denounced it, declaring that it would condemn the Filipino
people to slavery. In spite of opposition, President Roxas
was able to get it approved by his Congress.
By vigorous campaigning, he won the popular referen
dum on the constitutional amendment which would give Ameri
can capital equal rights with Filipino capital in developing
26




the country's resources and acquiring franchises for public
utilities.
One reason why he was able to get the referendum
accepted was that there was a popular impression that
further American aid for rehabilitation and reconstruction
was dependent on acceptance of the "parity clause."
There was a provision in the Philippine Rehabilita
tion Act passed by the United States Congress in 1946 which
limited payment on any war damages claim to $500 until the
trade agreement should go into effect, and the latter was
made dependent on acceptance by the Philippines of the
29
parity provision.
The parity provision required an amendment to the
Philippine Constitution. A reasonable amount of time was
allowed for the Filipinos to change their constitution to
conform to this provision. If it wece violated, the United
30
States could suspend the whole or any part of the agreement.
Ibid.
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Rehabilitation Act of 194.fi
The United States had a moral obligation to assist
in the monumental task of rehabilitation, and this obliga
tion was acknowledged during the war in a message by
President Roosevelt in August of 1943.
Pursuant to the commitment, President Truman, on
May 5, 1945, promised that the Philippines would be fully
assisted by the United States in the great problem of re
habilitation and reconstruction and sent Senator Tydings
as his special envoy to examine conditions in the Philip
pines, and to seek ways by which the United States might
contribute to rehabilitation.32
The result of this mission and of the investigation
sent out by the War Damage Corporation was the Philippine
Rehabilitation Act, approved on April 3. The Act provides
for the allocation of $250 million in cash and an additional
$100 million worth of surplus goods to be used to meet
31
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government needs and private or organizational claims for
war damages.
In addition, however, the Act provided for a
training program for Filipino technicians. The funds
appropriated were to be administered by the Philippine
War Damage Commission, consisting of three Presidential
appointees, of whom one was a Filipino.
The Commission was authorized to pass on claims
for damages and to pay compensation for them, either at
their cash value at the time damage occurred or at replacement
cost, which ever was less. And all amounts over $500 were to
33
be scaled down 25%.
There has been some criticism of this Act on the
ground that it did not provide for full compensation for
damages during the war, as had been promised by Roosevelt and
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While the amounts provided in the act clearly did
not equal the total calculated war losses, it is probably
a more serious criticism that even this did not come until
late.
The paramount purpose of this Act was to fulfill
American commitments, to acknowledge the fortitude and
heroism displayed by most Filipinos during the war, to com
pensate them for losses suffered, and, in general, to create
good will for the United States.35
What might have been a friendship-winning act of
American generosity became partly, instead, an enticement to
win acceptance of an unpalatable measure — the sugar-coat
ing on a bitter coating.
Why United States Granted Independence
In 1934, when the United States Congress promised
the Filipinos their independence, it expected the Philippines
would take its place in dignity and peace as a Christian,
democratic, and modern state.36
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When the promise was made, no one anticipated that
the first decade of independence would begin at the close
of World War II. The Philippines was a devastated country
when the day came for the United States to grant her in
dependence. The country was suffering from a ruined
economy, a corrupted social order, and a people torn by
divided loyalties.
Least of all, could it be foreseen that the American
and Filipino peoples would be forced into close alliance as
partners in a system of collective security? Practically
every assumption about the future development of the
Philippines and its relations with the United States has been
modified, and both sides have been slow to adjust, first to
the full implications of Philippine independence, and then
37
to the new development in American policy.
The first years of independence for the Philippines
were years of challenge and achievement. When the nation
became independent in 1946, it had just emerged from the




It was faced with massive problems — physical
devastation, the accompanying breakdown of law and order,
and a shortage of the material goods necessary for life.
Despite the many hardships, the Filipinos, with
American aid, have rehabilitated and restored their
ravaged land to a remarkable degree. While the Republic
was still engaged in this effort, its very existence was
threatened by the rise of a powerful communist guerilla
movement. This challenge, too, was met bravely and effective
ly by the young Republic.38
July 4, 1946, marked the end for American sovereign
ty over the Philippines. However, the Philippines received
its independence at a time when it was at its lowest ebb,
economically, politically, and militarily. Nevertheless,
with American assistance and cooperation, the Islands have
prospered well.
The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 had resulted partly
from strong pressures of American-producing classes to
eliminate Philippine competition and these groups exerted
a marked influence on the terms of the Act.39
38 Ibid., p. 9.
39
Pmkelstein, op. cit.. p. 26.
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As long as the Philippines remained a Commonwealth/
free entry would have to be granted Philippine goods. Sugar
cane and sugar beet growers and dairy farmers supported the
act and had a great deal of influence on it, because of the
large imports of sugar and coconut oil coming from the
Islands. Labor exerted strong influence because of the free
flow of workers coming in. Pressure was being applied
from the Philippine leaders. Another reason for granting
independence was the Depression in America.
The crucial element that determined whether or not
the Philippines reveived independence or remained as a
Commonwealth is stated in the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Section
Two of the Tydings-McDuffie Act states that the Philippines
must adopt a constitution.
. . . constitution drafted shall be republi
can in form, shall contain a bill of rights.41
Section Pour states: if a majority of the
votes cast are against the constitution, the
existing government of the Philippine Islands
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No provision was made in the act for improving
economic conditions. There were provisions for regulating
existing trade between the two countries. It must be
remembered that economic conditions showed up on the eve
of independence.
In a sense, the Philippines was. granted independence
because it had adopted and ratified a political system
predicated upon the American political system. Furthermore,






Politically, the Philippines were free, but economi
cally, in great need of the United States. In fact, the
most serious shortcomings of the American record became
apparent within a few years of independence when the Bell
Mission made a systematic review of the situation in the
Philippines and prepared a detailed report on what had to
be done by the Philippines and the United States if the
Republic were to survive the crisis of the 1950's.
The discussions and recommendations of the Bell
Mission extended to the social and institutional changes
that were necessary for economic growth. Many of the changes,
especially those relating to land tenure and productivity,
could have been brought about during the years of American
occupation. It also became clear that the United States had
"What Ails the Philippines: Summary of report by
Bell Mission," Scholastic, November 15, 1950, pp. 6-8.
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to devise new approaches and use new techniques to help
bring this about. The approach of the Tydings-McDuffie
era, which so strongly influenced the Trade and Rehabilita
tion Acts, was clearly out of date before World War II was
over.
It was clear that when the United States Congress
was fulfilling the promise of independence in 1946, it was
not laying the foundation for the development of a strong
and independent Philippine. The Filipinos got off to a
very bad start on the road to independence.
The first important revival of American interest
in the Philippines affairs came in 1950 when President
Elpidio Quirino asked the United States to send an economic
survey mission to the Philippines to give advice concerning
the establishment of a sound and well-balanced economy.
The new Republic was in trouble. Agricultural
production had reached pre-war levels in 1949; however,
the economy as a whole was not healthy. Wages were not up
to pre-war levels — prices were rising and the unemployment
2
George Taylor, The Philippines and the United States:




rate high. Government deficits were piling up, and there
were inflationary pressures. Due to a lack of funds, the
government discontinued public works and fell into arrears
in paying its civil servants. To make things worse, the
cost of supporting the army in its fight against the Huks
was destroying more and more of the national budget.
The crisis in government finances, combined with
the rising threat from the Huks, called for immediate
financial assistance. The United States decided to give
financial help.
The Bell report was the first one by the United
States to bring about changes in the political and economic
policies of the new independent Philippines. It marked the
beginning of a new era in the United States - Philippines
2
relatxons.
The paramount economic problems of the Philippines,
according to the Bell report, were inefficient production
and very low personal incomes. Standards of living for
4
Michael and Taylor, op.cit., p. 561.
Ibid., p. 563.
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most people were found below par. The Bell report then
6
attempted to find out why these conditions existed.
In the first place;
Little or nothing had been done to
increase productive efficiency and
diversify the economy. That the area
formerly under cultivation had been
restored, but the population had
increased twenty-five per cent during
the previous ten year. Almost nothing
had been done to open new lands for
the increased population, to improve
methods of cultivation. Furthermore,
the country relies too heavily on the
export of a few basic agricultural
crops - coconut, sugar and hemp -
which provided a meager livelihood to
most of the people engaged in their
production. Few enterprises had been
started, there had been little progress
in opening new work opportunities and
strengthening the economy. Moreover,
a permanent solution would be found only
through a determined effort on the part
of the people and the government of the
Philippines, with the aid and encourage
ment of the United States, to increase
production and improve productive effi
ciency to raiss the level of wages and farm
incomes, and to open new opportunities
for work and for acquiring land.7
6
"Bristling Report: Bell Report," Time, November 6,
1950, p. 35.
7
Taylor, op. cit.. p. 136.
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In essence, the report indicated that the Filipino
elite must develop a sense of responsibility for improving
the economic conditions of the mass of the people. The
basic recommendation was to increase the productivity of
agriculture in order to support the development of industry.
The mission suggested financial reforms, such as revision
of the tax structure, more efficient tax collection, and
improved credit and investment.
The report further called for social reforms to
bring about a rapid change in the condition of the peasants
and workers. In particular, it stressed the need for
legislation to improve health, education, and housing, to
establish minimum wages in agriculture, industry, and to
o
give workers the right to organize free trade unions.
Now, the Bell Mission recommended that the United States
make loans and grants of $250 million, provided the
Philippine government took steps to carry out recommendations
8 "Philippine Facts of Life: Bell Report," New Republic.
November 13, 1950, pp. 8-9.
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of its report. This meant the enactment of tax legisla
tion and other reforms, such as a minimum wage law.9
The United States was reluctant to make loans and
grants because it was felt that corruption existed in the
government and the funds would not be put to good use.
However, America agreed only if she were allowed to have a
hand in the supervision.
Quirino called a special session of Congress to
make provision for following through on the suggestions of
the Bell Report. It was very difficult to get passage of
the specific measures called for in the report.
Bills increasing individual and corporate income
taxes and establishing sales, privilege, luxury, and excise
taxes were eventually passed. There was a great deal of
opposition to new taxes on the ground that the United States
would have to assist the Philippines in any case as could
not allow the show case of democracy to go bankrupt, and the
9 Ibid.
Lawrence Finkelstein, American Diplomacy in Southeast
Asia (New York, 1951), p. 39.
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United States strategic interest were becoming more and
more apparent as the international situation grew worse.
There was reluctance of the Philippine government
to put pressure on the Congress to raise taxes in order to
get the financial aid promised in the Bell Report. In the
political struggle to secure passage of the tax measures
and the minimum wage law, both prerequisites for United
States assistance, other factors became involved in the
issue.
The tax laws became involved in a fight over a bill
to abolish bloc voting, the system by which one could vote
for the candidate for all offices merely by writing down the
12
name of the party. The advantage to the dominant party
was obvious.
The Senate, however, refused to vote on any House-
approved bills until the House passed the bill against bloc
voting so thetpresident had to accept its abolition in order
to get the tax law passed.
The act that was finally passed met the specifica
tion of the Bell Report, but it would not have done so
without American pressure. Although the Philippine govern-
13-Ibid. ~ "
Taylor, op. cit.. p. 144.
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merit did not meet all the conditions laid down in the
report, it met enough of them for the United States to
proceed with economic and technical assistance.
The Bell Report was an example of a thoughtful,
carefully prepared statement for a policy based on a
well-documented survey of the situation and an integrated
view of the Philippine society. The goals were socio-
economic in the broadest sense of the term; in fact, they
were revolutionary in the Philippine context.
This was a direct effort to reform a conflict-torn
society in order to create a sound basis for political
democracy, and it involved the use of economic leverage
to bring about legislation that otherwise would never have
14
been passed.
Viewed from the perspective of Americanopolicy,
the Bell Mission was a last-minute effort to correct the
results of fifty years of neglect in the Philippines. The
United States made no serious or effective effort to build





In addition, the Bell Report, by indicating a
willingness on the part of the United States government to
meet some of the Filipino objections to the Trade Act of
1946 and other matters, made it clear that the United
States1 policy was adjusting more than ever before to the
fact of Philippine independence.
Military Aid to the Philippines
No country can be independent if its military force
is unable to protect it from aggression and internal sub
version. The army was too weak to combat with any degree
of effectiveness the Huk forces without the use of American
troops.
Before independence was to be granted, Romulo realized
how acute the Philippines1 military situation was. He
appealed for immediate military assistance to enable the
Philippines to have something of a force when independence
came.
In 1946, Congress passed the Military Assistance




Filipino military would continue. The significance
of this relation between the two countries is often
underestimated. Yet, in the long run, the military assistance
may be more important than the political and economic be
cause it is associated with pride and national prestige.
The United States agreed to provide a joint mili
tary advisory group and military assistance in the train
ing of troops and the loan of weapons and equipment.
However, this equipment could be turned over to the
Philippine government by sale, loan, or gift, and a sum of
16
$19,750,000 was allocated for these purposes.
The Philippines agreed to purchase the bulk of its
military equipment in the United States, and to secure
United States approval of purchases that were made else-
1 7
where. Indeed, this gave the United States considerable
influence over the size and character of the Philippine
Robert A. Smith, Philippine Freedom. 1946-1958




Taylor, op. cit., p. 130.
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military forces.
Mutual Defense Between the Two Countries;
The Base Issue
In August of 1951, one year after the Korean war
began, the United States and the Philippines signed a treaty
of mutual defense. The treaty recognized that an armed
attack in the Pacific area on either party would be dan
gerous to both and declared that it would act to meet the
18
danger in accordance with its constitutional process.
A further problem in post-independent adjustment
of relations with the United States required a solution.
This was the question of the United States military establish
ment to be maintained in the Philippines.
The issuesof the status of America's bases had its
beginning in the first independence act (the Hare-Hawes-
Cutting Act of 1933) which authorized the United States to
keep as many bases in the Philippines as it wished.
President Quezon held this provision to be the
most objectionable part of the law at the time when he




The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, the substitute
law that was subsequently agreed upon, provided for the
surrender by the United States of all rights over military
and other reservations of the government of the United
States in the Philippines (except such naval reservations
and fueling stations as reserved under Section 5). The
final disposition of these naval bases was to be negotiated
between the two countries within two years after the
proclamation of independence.
In view of the fact that the Philippines was
attacked by Japan in 1941, the American Congress, in 1944,
approved a resolution reversing the policy on bases embodied
in the Tydings-McDuffie Act. President Quezon accepted this
resolution. It was speculated that he changed his mind
about the bases because the Islands had been attacked in
World War II.20
On the basis of this resolution, the two countries
negotiated for the lease of bases in the Philippines.




The result was the assignment to the United States twenty-
three bases for a 99-year period. This agreement went
21
into effect March, 1947.
SEATO
A further tie between the Philippines and the
United States was established in 1954, with the signing of
the Manila Pact, which created the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization.
In the Manila pact, the members agreed to cooperate
in order to improve their security against internal sub
version and to promote the economic progress and social
well-being of their people.
The treaty makes provisions for consultations
among the signatories in the event of a threat to any mem-
22
ber states.
At the same time that the members signed the Manila
Pact, they also endorsed a declaration of principles known
21 Ibid., p. 234.
22
Franz H. Miachael and George E. Taylor, The Far East
in the Modern World (New York, 1956), p. 97.
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as the Pacific Charter. This document dedicates the
signatories to uphold the principles of self-determination,
23
self-government, and independence for all countries.
Through bilateral and other economic arrangements,
SEATO members have assisted one another in promoting
economic development throughout the area.
23Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, Southeast
Asia Among World Powers (Lexington, 1957), p. 198.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Spanish era of occupation of the Philippines
was one of failure and accomplishments. Despite the fact
that Spain did not prepare the Filipinos for self-autonomy,
she did introduce them to Roman civil law, Catholic reli
gion, and culture.
During the three centuries of Spanish rule over the
Islands, the colony was developed almost solely with a view
to enrich the mother country and her colonial agents in the
Philippines, and to perpetuate the Catholic faith. In spite
of numerous decrees with regard to public instruction, it
was not until the latter years of the Spanish regime that
popular education was introduced on a very small scale.
In 1898, America came on the scene and dominated
the Philippines. America immediately began the task of
trying to develop the Philippines.
Through American assistance, education, health,
civil government and economics were improved — all of




Before the United States granted independence to
the Philippines, it was a Commonwealth for ten years in
order to improve further the conditions of the country be
fore independence was granted in 1946.
The United States helped the country in various
ways. The two most important methods were the Philippines1
Trade and Rehabilitation Acts.
Aiding in the fight for independence were two
organizations or parties — Nacionalista and the Sakdal.
However, the latter is non-existent today. These organiza
tions had a powerful influence on America in granting in
dependence to the Philippines.
Since World War II, the United States government
has, on several occasions, found it necessary to intervene in
Philippine affairs in a manner that was not acceptable to
European allies, and it may no longer be possible to do
again in the Philippines.
Political stability is desirable and attainable
if it is understood as the cultivation of attitudes and in
stitutions that further the growth of the Philippines toward
national independence and constructive partnership in the
free world.
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It hardly needs to be stated that the major re
sponsibility for giving content to the political independence
must be with the Filipinos themselves. The instituting of
sound fiscal practice, the introduction of agrarian reforms,
the diversification of production in all fields, these are
all Philippine problems for Filipinos to solve. Further
more, it is essential to the well-being of both these
countries that they remain friendly toward each other and
continue to work in harmony in order that communism may be
contained in certain areas of Southeast Asia.
The way has not been easy in the past, nor is it likely
to be easier in the future. There is no royal road to free
dom. Progress will continue between these two countries
as long as there is willingness on the part of both Ameri
cans and Filipinos.
The paramount problems for the future are economic
and military. The bases are to be terminated after the 99-
year lease is up. Economics will present another acute
problem; at the end of 1973, new economic policies must be
formulated between these two countries.
It is generally understood that United States
84
policies in Southeast Asia today depend paramountly on a
political and military partnership with the Republic of
the Philippines — a partnership that began on July 4, 1946,
the day America restored to the Philippines the independence
that it had wrested from Spain in 1898.
The major concern of United States policy is now
to maintain and develop this peculiarly intimate, complex,
and dynamic relationship to its maximum. Without the
military and political partnership between these two
countries, the United States1 position in Southeast Asia
would be extremely difficult. Properly handled, it can
become a creative instrument of fruitful benefit to both
countries and of enormous influence in Asia.
The success of the partnership can no longer be
taken for granted. In view of the likelihood that the
efforts of the communist bloc to take over Southeast Asia
will mount in intensity, the task will not be easy, "it
is important, therefore, that the United States1 policy
be directed to the task of political and economic develop
ment.11 1
1 George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United
States:—Problems of Partnership (New York, 1964), p. 5.
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Filipinos today continue to face a number of
serious problems similar to those confronting many
developing countries. The nation is unable to provide
sufficient facilities for education, adequate housing,
and medical care for its citizens.
Backward methods of farming, insufficient rural
credit facilities, inadequate irrigation system, and an
outmoded system of land tenancy have kept a large part
of the rural population in poverty. Underemployment is
widespread. The government has not yet addressed itself
to the task of implementing a coherent industrialization
program.
Despite these problems, Filipinos can look to the
future with hope and confidence. Though there have been
serious setbacks from time to time, the Philippine economy
is in general characterized by growth and development. The
nation has received and continues to receive substantial
contributions toward its economic development from the
United Stated.
No fair-minded person can study the course of events
in the Philippine Islands without realizing that, in the main,
the United States has notably improved conditions of the
86
Filipinos and prepared them for nationality. What
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